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This research investigates the impact of legislative incumbency in municipal elections for 
305 Portuguese municipalities, in 8 sub-national elections, from 1985 to 2013. Among other 
contributions, this research adds to the existing literature by studying the effect of national 
economic variables in municipal elections, as well as partisan effects, using a two-way fixed 
group and time effects model. Despite being ambiguous for the left of centre party in terms of 
a national incumbency penalty, the empirical results suggest that PSD is penalised in the local 
elections if in government and that both the state of national economy and partisan effects on 
the vote shares of the two main Portuguese parties are mixed for municipal elections. 
Keywords: Partisanhip, Economy, Incumbency, Fixed Group and Time Effects Model. 
I. Introduction 
In the large sum of existent literature on electoral behaviour, there are numerous 
peculiarities that have left scientists puzzled. One particular regularity, epitomized in the United 
States of America, is the midterm cycle: the party holding the White House loses votes and 
seats in each midterm congressional election, relative to the previous, on-year, election1. In 
spite of that, and although there exists a vast literature on the midterm effect in America, a 
presidential system, the existence and importance of this balancing behaviour for parliamentary 
democracies, is yet to be further examined and a more systematic look at moderating behaviour 
in other industrial democracies like Portugal is undoubtedly a fruitful area of research.  
Moreover, the midterm cycle is generally considered as one of the catalysts for an 
extensive analysis on institutional balancing behaviour, economic voting and partisan 
macroeconomic policies and their effects. Research on this regularity has focused on a set of 
reasons, such as the withdrawal of coattails from major elections, a referendum on popularity 
                                                 
1 In the presidential election (on-year) the executive, composed of the President and its cabinet, is chosen. At the 
on-year election, the legislature, i.e. the Congress, also holds elections. However, there are congressional elections 
2 years after the presidential election. It is called the midterm election (off-year). 
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and performance and/or a simply penalty on the incumbent government party. While these 
explanations can be seen as purely competitive, they rather ought to be seen as complimentary, 
with the two latter explanations proving to be the ones that are more consistent with 
contemporaneous theory. Thus, this research proposes to answer the question on whether there 
is an institutional balancing behaviour through national and sub-national elections in a 
parliamentary democracy, while evaluating the driving forces that lead to this adjustment.   
Following Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1995) integrated approach to explain the American 
Political Economy, this paper adds to the existent literature by i) studying a phenomenon that 
resembles the midterm cycle in Portugal, through the interaction between legislative and 
municipal elections; ii) scrutinising the presence of economic voting and partisan interaction 
effects in local elections; iii) develop the hypothesis that voters are retrospective when 
evaluating the incumbent’s performance; iv) examine the pros and cons of incumbency not only 
between legislative and municipal elections, but also exclusively at a local level.   
The results of this empirical study support i) national incumbency penalty only for the 
right of centre party (PSD); ii) the existence of economic voting; iii) mixed effects in terms of 
partisan effects; iv) the presence of retrospective voting; v) incumbency advantage in municipal 
elections only for PSD. 
II. Literature Review 
This section aims at providing an assessment of the previous research, and will then 
converge to the topic of interest, contextualizing it and reflecting the scarcity of studies on the 
subject outside America. Thus, this segment will begin with a review of the existent literature 
on the analyses of electoral behaviour, and will then proceed to dissect the debate regarding the 
midterm cycle, institutional moderation, economic voting, partisan effects as well as several 
other features of the literature, while scrutinising the differences of distinct political systems. 
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Finally, an enclosing theoretical framework that takes into account different directional policy 
models will be laid out. 
The literature on electoral behaviour is extensive and increasingly sophisticated. The first 
studies were evocative and elementary, dealing with broad feelings about how people voted 
during bad times. Dating back to the 1920s and 1930s, these primary works had limited 
theoretical work and rudimental empirical tools, with the bulk of them being involved in ad hoc 
empiricism. As Monroe (1979) states “There was little concern with allowing for the 
simultaneous impact of many economics variables or for the effects of political incumbency or 
coattails”. Thus, scientists would resort to simple correlations and tabulations or comparisons 
of the number of votes with a subjectively derived index of economic well-being or business 
activity. 
As the studies began to describe more specific intricacies existent in the various political 
systems, while trying to create models that would explain and enclose those complexities, there 
was one that easily surfaced - the midterm effect regularity. V. O. Key (1958) touched the 
midterm loss phenomena when he suggested that the nature of it lacked explanation in any 
theory of a rational electorate. Key states that “Since the electorate cannot change 
administrators at midterm elections, it can only express its approval or disapproval by returning 
or withdrawing legislative majorities” while adding that there is no logical explanation for why 
the electorate leans towards punishing the President’s party.  
Moreover, it is important to note that the midterm verdict is far more than a tendency, it 
is an “almost invariable historical regularity” as Erikson (1988) puts it. There was only one 
midterm seat gain, the Democratic gain of 1934, but was accompanied by a small vote loss for 
the incumbent’s party. In terms of votes, there is only one instance in the twentieth century, in 
1926, where the president’s party experienced a midterm gain, as Niemi and Fett (1986) show. 
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Furthermore, Stokes and Miller (1962), using survey data, gather some interesting 
insights on the information the electorate possesses and how it acts. They find that the only 
piece of information every American voter is guaranteed is the congressional candidate’s party 
and thus, the public responds to party symbols, while these have limited meaning in terms of 
legislative policy. Additionally, their analysis shows that there are little partisan swings 
compared to on-year elections. This last result, combined with the fact there is an invariable 
loss for the President’s party, constitute the fundamental facts of midterm elections and suggest 
an electorate that, after a more frantic Presidential race, returns to their usual partisan alignment. 
However, this matter has to be examined more carefully as any additional valid piece of 
the midterm loss puzzle unveils a hidden perspective of it. In this line of thought, both Campbell 
and Key emphasized the differences in turnout in off-year compared to on-year elections. These 
differences were not solely in terms of the size, but also on its momentum and constituency. V. 
O. Key (1958) pointed out that whenever there has been a significant increase in the turnout in 
a presidential election the increment of votes has always gone essentially to one party. 
Moreover, Angus Campbell (1964) distinguishes between marginal voters and habitual voters, 
with the latter having what he called intrinsic political interest and thus, they are people that 
vote in almost all elections; the marginal voters are moved by short-term political forces. Also, 
Campbell pointed out that “the smaller the turnout in a national election, the greater the 
proportion of the vote which is contributed by people of established party loyalties”, reflecting 
the so-called “normal voting strength”. Therefore, he concludes that if short-term political 
forces were balanced in partisan terms, there wouldn’t be a percentage deviation from the 
normal party strength. But, if the forces favour one of the parties, there will be a large swing of 
marginal voters that will tip the vote division towards the favoured party. 
Likewise, Samuel Kernell (1977) also touched the case for differences in turnout by 
defending that the citizens showing up at midterm elections would probably be more 
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sophisticated and/or interested. One should expect, given that at the midterm the President is 
the only reference and the congressional contenders are poorly differentiated2, more unsatisfied 
people to vote against the incumbent, making it an election more suitable for negative voting. 
At this point, it is important to note that while the literature on the midterm cycle is 
growing, it has actually increased confusion rather than clarity over the subject. Despite the fact 
that, as Key defended, “It is the magnitude of the loss that is important”, the fundamental 
question is why it occurs, i.e. why does the president’s party always lose seats at the midterm 
instead of gaining or maintaining the ones it already has?  
In Erikson’s paper entitled “The Puzzle of Midterm Loss”, the standard interpretations 
and a new explanation for the midterm slump are scrutinised and compared with historical data. 
He argues that the vote loss must come from one of the following two forces. Either it could 
result from an unusual “low vote for the president’s party in the midterm year”. Or, it could be 
the ordinary “drop following an abnormally high vote for the winning presidential party in the 
previous presidential year”. Therefore, he continues by presenting the three standard and 
competing interpretations of the midterm cycle. He argues that the loss can be seen as a 
Regression to the Mean, Surge and Decline or as a Referendum on Presidential Performance. 
Furthermore, he adds his own explanation – Midterm Loss as a Presidential Penalty. 
Hence, let us consider and dissect the four alternatives3 existent in the literature. First, the 
Regression to the Mean hypothesis describes the midterm loss as the midterm withdrawal of 
presidential coattails. In the on-year election, the winning presidential party does better than 
usual due to the presidential coattails. Whereas, at the subsequent off-year election, in “the 
                                                 
2 Studies have shown that the congressional candidates and the public image of the Congress is rather 
undifferentiated. Stokes and Miller (1962) report the lack of information the electorate has over the congressional 
candidates. Moreover, they discuss the relevance of it for accountability, party cohesion and the flow of legislation. 
Arsenau and Wolfinger (1973) provide evidence that “congressional candidates are likely to suffer or benefit from 
voters’ estimates of how well the president has been doing his job”. 
3 In effect, these set of theories ought to be considered as complimentary rather than purely competitive. 
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absence of this coattail help” as J. E. Campbell (1985) notes, the incumbent party’s vote share 
declines, as its expectation is only an average outcome4. 
Moreover, the literature has focused on comparing the seat loss to either the presidential 
victory margin (Hinckley, 1967; J. E. Campbell, 1985) or the seats won in the on-year election, 
with an increase in the latter variables linked to an increase in the former. Still, while some 
authors have refuted this hypothesis (Erikson, 1988), others have confirmed their existence, but 
also their decline since the 1950s (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1984). 
Likewise, the Surge and Decline theory (Campbell, 1966) also explains midterm losses 
as a function of the previous presidential election. It describes these losses by the difference in 
the stimulus of on-year and off-year elections. Bearing in mind Key’s increment of favoured 
party votes, Campbell’s distinction between different types of voters, his “normal voting 
strength” term, and the voter’s tendency to cast straight party ballots5, the inner workings of 
this theory can be summarized as following. As the presidency is the focus of politics in 
America, they are high-stimulus elections with a surge of information, interest and turnout. 
Moreover, one of the presidential candidates has an advantage of personality, party, or other 
trait6 that entices the marginal voters (and some habitual voters too). Thus, the contender as 
well as congressional candidates of its party benefit at the on-year election. In the off-year, the 
low stimulus election, the marginal voters do not vote and the habitual voters that deserted, 
return to their partisan alignment. Consequently, these actions hurt the incumbent party at the 
midterm. 
Several authors, especially the ones related to this two hypothesis, have stated an 
important insight that ought to be added at this point. Given the method of translation of votes 
                                                 
4 The withdrawn of coattails is an example of statistical regression to the mean and thus, as Erikson (1988) states 
“the magnitude of any regression toward the mean depends mathematically on the size of the lagged effect of prior 
observations on current observations”. 
5 The two last assumptions are supported by Stokes and Miller (1962). 
6 The decisive factors work through short-term political forces (Campbell, 1964). 
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into seats, the referendum at midterm is sometimes poorly reflected in the resulting partisan 
distribution of seats7.  
While some studies produced evidence in support of the Surge and Decline theory 
(Campbell, 1966; Hinckley, 1967), this hypothesis, together with the Regression to the Mean 
one, are no longer the dominant explanations of midterms losses.  Other set of theories focusing 
on the circumstances surrounding the midterm itself have emerged. These theories perceive the 
midterm as a Referendum on Presidential Performance and hence, on the shape of the economy 
and the popularity of the incumbent president and its cabinet. 
Although there were several studies since the 1920’s that focused on the link between the 
incumbent’s vote share, economic performance and popularity, it was Gerald Kramer’s 
systematic empirical analysis of economic influences on electoral behaviour in 1971 that, not 
only paved the way for the use of more sophisticated statistical techniques, but also reintroduced 
the rational economic-political actor8, while providing an explicit theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, he considers congressional voting in relation to changes in unemployment from 
the preceding year; relative change in per capita real income; changes in money income; 
changes in the price level. Additionally, he introduces a coattails parameter in a presidential 
election; he ignores it in other elections. Kramer concludes that economic upturn helps 
congressional candidates of the incumbent party, while economic deterioration benefits the 
opposition. Also, presidential coattails can help congressional candidates. 
Moreover, as a result of Kramer’s work, not only rational choice theorists begun to 
construct empirical tests of rational choice propositions using survey data9, but the debate on 
                                                 
7 See Hinckley (1967) and Tufte (1973) for a more in-depth description of how the translation of votes into seats 
works. 
8 Kramer suggests a rational actor who votes on the basis of the most easily available information (i.e. past 
performance of the incumbent party). Moreover, this information shall reflect actual policies of a party or 
incumbent. He defends that the rational actor will view voting as a choice between two alternatives on economic 
policies and thus, on two sets of economic conditions. Additionally, he assumes that voters will view congressional 
candidates as party members rather than as individuals. Thus, his assumptions on how voters perceive the elections 
and the information they gather are supported by Stokes and Miller (1962) work. 
9 One of the most notable studies in this line of thought belongs to Fiorina (1978).  
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economic and popularity influences on electoral behaviour was reopened, while an emphasis 
on the midterm regularity was preserved.  
Some authors, such as George Stigler (1973), responded with strong critics and showed 
how extremely sensitive empirical results are to slight adjustments in definition and years 
included in the analysis. Furthermore, Francisco Arcelus and Allan Meltzer’s (1975) work on 
congressional voting takes into account participation rates by stressing a two-step process from 
the electorate: the decision to vote and the decision about the preferred candidate or party. They 
conclude that the economy affects participation rates rather than voting and contrary to 
Kramer’s research, there is a lack of influence from several economic variables, with 
unemployment and inflation as exceptions. They argue that this lack of influence may be due 
to sophisticated voters that not only consider short-term fluctuations but also ponder long-run 
economic factors. 
The discordance around how the economy affected voting motivated responses from both 
sides and although the literature can be regarded as confusing when it comes to the channel 
through which it affects voting and the size of that influence, there is a reasonable amount of 
certainty that it does have an impact10.  
Furthermore, Edward Tufte (1975) seeks an explanation for the outcomes of the midterm 
elections and proposes a two-stage model. First, he explains the magnitude of the midterm vote 
loss of the President’s party by considering the public approval rating of the President at the 
off-year election (popularity measure11) and the pre-election shifts in economic condition. 
Then, aware of the distinction between votes and seats, he compares the actual vote loss with 
the number of seats lost by the President’s party. Supplemented by his robust results, he 
                                                 
10 Howard Bloom and Douglas Price (1975) conclude that there is political blame but not reward for economic 
conditions. Moreover, the literature has thought us that changes in variables such as unemployment, inflation, real 
per capita income and GDP growth rate do have an impact on voting. 
11 Some authors, such as Samuel Kernell (1977 and 1978), focus almost solely on the popularity aspect. He argues 
that popularity must be related to “real events and conditions” and that it “responds slowly to environmental 
changes”. Thus, he claims that popularity is “experimental and incremental”. 
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concludes that the voters use the midterm election as a referendum, but the institutional 
structure of the electoral system limits their actions. In addition, James Piereson (1975) proves 
that “the impact of presidential popularity upon midterm elections is not restricted to contests 
for the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, but also extends to state races for governor 
(…) lower level state and local offices”. 
Before moving to the alternative proposed by Erikson (1988), an important feature of the 
literature ought to be presented. This aspect is the Political Business Cycle and/or Electoral 
Control. Directly related to the Referendum explanation for the midterm loss, cyclical 
manipulation of macroeconomic variables would cause an outburst of growth immediately 
before an election and thus, bias the result of the midterm verdict when it comes to economic 
variables. Moreover, the traditional political business cycle model proposed by Nordhaus 
(1975) assumes that the parties are only opportunistic and hence, they maximize only the 
probability of re-election. Additionally, as in Hibbs’s partisan theory work (1977), an 
exploitable Phillips curve is available to policymakers. Consequently, a pre-electoral 
expansionary policy would be substituted by a post-electoral recession. In his model, Nordhaus, 
assumes that voters, who are backward looking, have short memories12 and never learn from 
past mistakes, reward the incumbent because of pre-electoral expansion, forgetting that they 
will have to pay for it with a post-electoral downturn.  
Furthermore, Nordhaus’s model comprises two elements of non-rational behaviour. The 
backward-looking formation in expectations and naïve retrospective voting. Alesina and 
Rosenthal (1995) argue that such a model may not survive in a rational expectations and rational 
voter behaviour context. Moreover, recent research by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff 
(1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1990) suggests that Nordhaus’s results can be obtained in an 
                                                 
12 Chappell and Keech (1983) argue that cyclical manipulation occurs for all types of voters’ memories, although 
it is less pronounced. 
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environment of fully rational but imperfectly informed13 voters, but that rationality of voters’ 
behaviour limits the latitude of policymakers’ ability to behave opportunistically. Also, if the 
policymakers had the ability to control the electorate through business cycles why wouldn’t the 
midterm cycle vanish over time? Conclusively, Alesina and Rosenthal state that “These rational 
models are consistent with occasional, short-lived pre-electoral policy manipulations. They 
cannot be consistent with a regular four-year cycle of unemployment and growth as predicted 
by Nordhaus”. 
In his paper, Erikson rejects the first three explanations for the midterm cycle and explains 
its own. He argues that the midterm loss could be justified through a “punitive response of an 
electorate that penalizes the presidential party regardless of the quality of its performance or 
standing with electorate”, i.e. the electorate would punish the presidential party for being the 
party in power. 
Moreover, the reasons for this phenomenon could be linked to Samuel Kernell’s negative 
voting theory14 or to a simple balance theory. The latter, would consist on a rational calculation 
by the electorate, specifically, of a significant share of voters that would see themselves as in 
between the parties’ positions on policy issues. Such voters would prefer to split partisan control 
of the presidency and the Congress in order to create a “balance of power” and thus, they would 
be motivated to oppose the presidential party at midterm. Fiorina (1988) suggests that if there 
is polarization of American parties, “voters in the middle will split their presidential-
congressional tickets as an ideological hedge”. 
More recently, Alesina and Rosenthal in “Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the 
Economy” construct a theory of institutional balancing based on the rational choice approach, 
specifically, through the formation of rational expectations. With their theory, they are able to 
                                                 
13 Literature has concentrated on information regarding policimakers’ competence and objectives. 
14 At midterm, citizens are more likely to vote when they hold negative views of the president. 
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explain the midterm cycle while enclosing other strands of the literature, such as partisan 
macroeconomic policies and divided government. 
First of all, they refute policy convergence models where even though voters care about 
public policy, candidates only care about winning. Downs (1957) and Black (1958) had 
important contributions to this type of models, with the latter producing the most famous 
convergence result – the median voter theorem – that implied, succinctly, that candidates 
converge to the policy most preferred by the median voter. But, given the existence of party 
polarization, uncertainty of outcomes, incomplete information and the issue on credibility of 
policy platforms, full convergence never occurs. On the other hand, the scenario of partisan 
politics with alternation between extreme policies of two polarized parties ignores the 
institutional structure that leads to policy formation. The executive-legislative interaction leads 
to policy moderation and thus, extreme policies are greatly muted. 
Furthermore, Alesina and Rosenthal build on Fiorina’s split-ticket voters to create the 
pivotal-voter theorem, which aims to explain the midterm cycle and divided government. Given 
that policy is formed through an interaction between the presidency and the congress, there are, 
for example, Republican voters that prefer a more left policy while facing a Republican 
president and thus, these are voters that would vote for the Democrats in the legislature (the 
case for Democratic voters preferring a more right-wing policy while facing a Democratic 
president is analogous). Additionally, it is easy to realize how this generates policy moderation. 
With a Republic president and a strong Democratic party in the legislature, moderation is 
effortlessly attainable15.  Moreover, the key for the midterm cycle is the fact that on-year 
elections are held under uncertainty about the identity of the president, while there’s no doubt 
about it in off-year elections.  
                                                 
15 Chapter 3 and 4 of Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1995) book for a deeper understanding. 
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They extend their basic model and test its robustness by encompassing a variety of issues 
in voting theory in a rich and realistic institutional setup. The case of heterogeneous parties, 
staggered terms of office for senators, mobile parties, incumbency advantage of congressional 
candidates are discriminated and comply with the model. Also, while considering the case for 
partisan business cycles, the authors encompass contemporary macroeconomic theory to create 
a model characterized by rational behaviour and by frictions in the wage-price16 adjustment 
mechanism – the rational partisan theory. Plus, they enrich that model by considering the 
electorate’s concern about administrative competence. 
Still, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) dedicate a chapter to partisan economic policy and 
divided government in parliamentary democracies in their book, arguing that they are not a 
uniquely American phenomenon. Furthermore, they argue that parliamentary democracies also 
experience partisan cycles17 and long periods of divided government, mainly due to the fact 
that a coalition is considered, by definition, to be an example of divided power. Likewise, sub-
national elections, as the municipal balloting in Portugal, are elections where there is some 
executive power at stake, despite being less important. Local factors are said to have a major 
significance in either the party strategies and the electoral decision. But since they are typically 
not held at the same time as the national elections, there can be some sort of balancing behaviour 
that resembles the American midterm cycle. 
This balancing behaviour requires that some of the voters who have favoured the parties 
running the national government systematically turn against them in sub-national elections. 
Moreover, an important aspect is whether that division of power balances polarized parties. 
Laver and Schofield (1990) argue that, given that the pattern of coalition government dynamics 
cannot be explained through an “office-seeking” assumption, political parties are polarized and 
policy motivated, specifically in economic terms. Additionally, Alesina and Rosenthal defend 
                                                 
16 The authors follow a version of the wage contract model from Fischer (1977). 
17 See Hibbs (1977). 
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that not only there is retrospective voting in parliamentary democracies but also, office oriented 
political business cycles18 are absent from them. Moreover, it is important to point out a very 
important feature that Hibbs (1977) called attention to. This feature regards partisan interaction 
effects and how the left chooses systematically different macroeconomic policies from the ones 
chosen by parties more to the right. The left, is more willing to bear the costs of inflation in 
order to reduce unemployment and increase growth. Thus, a rational and retrospective 
electorate should take this into account when voting, i.e. if inflation is rising, a party right of 
the centre should receive more votes as they are perceived as better suited to deal with it, given 
past performance. On the contrary, if unemployment is rising, left parties should experience a 
surge in the number of votes due to their seemingly superior ability to deal with that problem. 
This constitutes Swank’s (1993) partisan model, where he assumed that vote intentions should 
shift depending upon which party’s policy bias is best-suited for current economic conditions. 
On the other hand, Powell and Whitten (1993), in their ideological responsibility hypothesis 
argue that a government should be held more responsible for the variables that it, or its 
constituency, care about the most. 
Finally, studies on Germany and France have proved that their electorate moderates by 
means of institutional balancing. Nonetheless, formal empirical research on this phenomenon 
in other parliamentary democracies is still in an embryonic stage. Studies of this nature in 
Portugal19 have shown an electorate attentive to the impact of local and national economic 
conditions on legislative elections. However, voters seem very myopic, attaching greater 
importance to the very recent past, while national economic conditions seem to weight more in 
their voting decision for sub-national elections. Also, they seem to be retrospective rather than 
perspective voters. Veiga and Veiga (2004) research on the determinants of vote intentions in 
                                                 
18 See Nordhaus (1975). 
19 See Veiga e Veiga (2004; 2010). 
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Portugal show an electorate more in line with the ideological responsibility hypothesis, for 
legislative elections. 
Furthermore, it is important to note the complexity of the executive-legislative paradigm 
in a parliamentary democracy like Portugal. The Government, elected in the national election, 
has most of the executive and legislative power, sharing some of the former power with the 
President. Thus, municipalities have limited executive power, although enjoying some 
autonomy. 
III. Methodology 
The objective of this research is to examine several features of the Portuguese political 
economy, while providing a rationale based on the literature20. First, it intends to study the 
existence of an institutional balancing behaviour between national and sub-national elections 
that could result in a phenomenon that resembles the midterm cycle and thus, leading to a 
divided government. Second, it scrutinises the presence of economic voting and partisan effects. 
Thirdly, it touches the subject of retrospective voting in Portugal by giving emphasis to it. 
Finally, it also looks at incumbency at a municipal level exclusively. 
The dataset21 used in this research consists of a panel of 305 municipalities22 comprised 
in the Portuguese territory and 9 years of yearly data (from 1982 to 2013, but with gaps) which 
correspond to 9 municipal elections23. The dataset comprises a set of national economic 
variables and political variables, plus other variables of interest constructed by the author.  
The national economic variables are Inflation, Unemployment Rate and the growth rate 
of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). These variables are equal between municipalities 
                                                 
20 A coattails and popularity analysis between legislative and municipal elections is overlooked. 
21 Consult the appendix for descriptive statistics. 
22 Portugal has 308 municipalities in total, but three of them (Vizela, Odivelas and Trofa) were only created in 
1998 and thus, there’s no data before that date. For this reason, they were excluded from the analysis. 
23 There were 12 municipal elections since Portugal became a democracy. The data for the first two (1976 and 
1979) and the last one (2017) was not available. The data for the 1982 election is used solely to compute the 
differences. 
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but different among the years and correspond to the year preceding the municipal election years 
in order to mimic the state of the economy just before the elections for the local representatives. 
This follows Kramer (1971), Tufte (1975) and Veiga and Veiga (2010) who take into account 
myopic voters by measuring the performance of the economy in the year prior to the elections. 
Also, Lewis-Beck (1988) confirms that economic conditions strongly influence electoral results 
in parliamentary democracies. Like most of the authors he considers that low inflation, low 
unemployment and high growth benefit the incumbent government. All of these variables are 
widely accepted in the literature, particularly the first two, given their relation, epitomized in 
the Phillips curve.  
Inflation is derived from the Consumer Price Index available at the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. Additionally, the Unemployment Rate was obtained from the OECD’s 
Main Economic Indicators and the growth rate of the real GDP was derived from real GDP data 
available at the World Bank. 
Political data, namely electoral results of the 8 municipal elections for the main 
Portuguese parties (PS; PSD) as well as their relevant coalitions (PAF24; PSCDS; PSPCP) was 
collected, with the research focusing more on the parties that already won an election for a 
legislative term25. The dataset was obtained from SGMAI – Secretaria Geral do Ministério da 
Administração Interna26.  
In this section, the model construction is described in two phases. First, the motivation 
for the use of such model is specified, with a baseline equation being presented. Moreover, 
throughout this first segment, issues, assumptions and characteristics associated with the model 
as well as the estimation strategy will be scrutinized. Finally, the model is augmented to test 
                                                 
24 PAF is a coalition between PSD and CDS. Formerly, PSD, CDS and PPM formed a coalition called AD that 
participated, as PAF did, in the municipal elections. The relevance of the PPM and CDS was taken into account 
when constructing the dataset. 
25 Also, these are the parties closer to the centre. Thus, where more split-ticket voters ought to be.  
26 Missing pieces of data were thoroughly inspected and fulfilled, sometimes, directly from the municipality. 
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the robustness of our estimates while augmenting the dimensions examined. Moreover, given 
the data collected, other regressions and their results are presented to increase the robustness of 
the set of hypothesis followed, while testing for other characteristics of the Portuguese Political 
Economy. 
1. Baseline Model: 
For the purposes specified in the beginning of this section and given that the use of panel 
data has its primary motivation in solving the omitted variables problem, a basic linear 
unobserved effects panel data model was constructed. To determine the correct procedure to 
deal with unobserved effects, the Hausman Test27 is performed for all the regressions included 
in this research. The test assesses the null hypothesis that both random and fixed models 
produce consistent estimators, against the alternative that only the fixed effects model would 
do so. The results of the test suggest that, for all the regressions, a fixed effects model should 
be applied. Moreover, we are not only interested in controlling for individual effects but also 
to control for time effects, i.e. not only we account for variables that are constant over time and 
vary across individuals but also for variables that are constant across states and vary over time28.  
Hence, the model applied here is a two-way fixed group and time effect one and the 
baseline equation is the following: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 =  𝛼𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (1)          
where 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 corresponds to the variation of votes in municipal 
elections in municipality i, for party j, 𝜇𝑖 corresponds to the municipality i individual effects, 
𝛿𝑡 is a dummy variable for the election of year t, 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 corresponds to the absolute vote 
received by each party j in municipality i in the previous municipal election (t-1), 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 
corresponds to the absolute value of votes obtained by party j at the legislative election that 
                                                 
27 See Hausman (1979) 
28 The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the time dummies were all equal to zero is rejected for all the 
regressions. 
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precedes the municipal election at t,  𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 corresponds to a vector of economic variables (whose 
values are equal for all municipalities) and 𝑖,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error. Hence, it intends to 
determine the partial effects of legislative votes and national economic variables on the 
variation of votes in the next municipal elections29. 
The gains and losses as a dependent variable follows Paldam (1991). Also, the inclusion 
of the absolute vote received by each party in the last election is due to the fact that “partisanship 
and social cleavages typically create a fairly stable base of party support from election to 
election” as Powell and Whitten (1993) note. The introduction of this variable, in a dynamic 
panel model, according to the econometric framework of panel data, may create an endogeneity 
problem. However, the data panel that this research relies on is not considered to be dynamic 
given that there’s only 8 elections separated by 4 years30. Moreover, we expect its coefficient 
to be negative, because it is easier to lose an absolute percentage of the electorate from a larger 
base. 
We have already determined that a fixed effects model should be applied. In this type of 
model, it is allowed for the unobservable variables to be correlated with the regressors and they 
are treated as a parameter to be estimated for each cross-section observation i. On the other 
hand, in a random effects model, the unobservable variables are assumed to be random and not 
correlated with the explanatory variables. Thus, the fixed effects are put into the error term 
under the assumption that they are orthogonal to the regressors as Wooldridge (2010) reports.  
The time and entity fixed effects model is a variant of the multiple regression model. 
Thus, their coefficients can be estimated by OLS by including the additional time binary 
variables. Alternatively, in a balanced panel such as ours, the coefficients on the regressors can 
be computed by first deviating the regressand and the regressors from their entity and time-
                                                 
29 Municipal economic variables were ignored as national variables play a major role in influencing electoral 
outcomes, as Veiga and Veiga (2010) report. 
30 Also, endogeneity could be a problem in the context of autocorrelation, that does not exist. The standard errors 
are accounted for this issue. Moreover, the demeaning also doesn’t seem to affect the results. 
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period means and then by estimating the multiple regression equation of deviated regressand 
on the deviated regressors. Subtracting the mean of each series from each observation is the 
within transformation applied by Hansen to fixed effects. 
Thus, the assumptions for this kind of model are relatively similar to the OLS 
assumptions. Firstly, the error term must have conditional mean zero, given all T values of the 
explanatory variables for an entity. This consists of the classical strict exogeneity assumption 
31applied to panel data. Secondly, the variables for one entity have to be distributed identically 
to, but independently of, the variables for another entity, i.e. they are i.i.d. across entities for i 
= 1,…, n. It makes no restriction on how the variables are distributed within an entity. Thirdly, 
large outliers are unlikely - the explanatory variables and the idiosyncratic error have nonzero 
finite fourth moments. Finally, there can be no multicollinearity. 
The correlation that is allowed between the unobservable variables and the regressors 
does not introduce bias into the fixed effects estimator, “but it affects the variance of the fixed 
effects estimator and therefore it affects how one computes standard errors” as Stock and 
Watson (2007) note. To deal with this problem the standard errors computed in this research 
are so-called clustered standard errors, a type of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) standard errors. They are clustered because they allow the regression errors 
to have an arbitrary correlation within a cluster (in panel data, an entity), but assume that the 
regression errors are uncorrelated across clusters. Moreover, unit root tests do not justify in this 
case. 
2. Augmentation: 
In this second phase specification, the model is augmented. First, the variable 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if party j is the government’s party at time t 
                                                 
31 A fixed effects analysis is more robust than random effects analysis, in the sense that a random effects analysis 
has an extra assumption regarding strict exogeneity – we assume orthogonality between the unobserved variables 
and the independent ones. 
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and to 0 otherwise, is added to the regression to test the effect of incumbency in the legislative 
election on the variation of votes in the subsequent municipal election. Next, we allow for the 
interaction between 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡, and 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 to deeper our understanding through which channel 
and to what level are the parties punished in sub-national elections. Hence, we interact these 
variables in order to inspect how the variation in municipal votes for party j changes with the 
national economic conditions, when that party is the incumbent in the national government. 
Hence, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is added to better account for the incumbency bias. With this 
interaction, we are reviewing whether economic voting exists, while checking for an 
incumbency penalty or reward. Also, how this verdict occurs can shed a light on partisan effects 
and retrospective voting. Although only certain specifications are tested due to issues of 
collinearity, the full augmented model is of the following form: 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
=  𝛼𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡)
+ 𝛽2(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                          (2) 
Therefore, it intends to give us a more detailed clarification for the results of equation (1). 
The estimation results of the first equation are tested via other specifications, to test the 
robustness of our estimates while augmenting the dimensions examined. Thus, through the 
interaction terms, conclusions can be drawn regarding three strands of the literature. First, we 
can account better for the impact of incumbency. Next, the way vote intentions are formed, i.e. 
the type of evaluation the electorate makes of economic performance (retrospective or 
perspective voting). Additionally, the perception from the electorate of the two parties’ ability 
to handle macroeconomic issues and how the vote intentions depend on the ideology of the 
incumbent is also examined. 
Following the first augmentation of the model through the interaction terms, another 
variable is tested. This variable, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if party j 
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was the party that won the election at the election previous to t in municipality i. Thus, it intends 
to explore the degree of persistence and to better comprehend how important it is to be the 
municipal incumbent for the next local election for the two different parties, i.e. to investigate 
the capability of voter retention.    
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 =  𝛼𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡) +
 𝛽2(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                         (3)  
IV. Results 
 
The main findings of the two-way fixed group and time effect model, as specified in the 
equations from the previous section (III) are described in this section. Table 2 summarizes the 
results for all the equations and Graphics 1 to 3 compare coefficients between parties (non-
significant values are represented as non-solid bars). As specified before, the 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 variable is used to capture the effects of incumbency in the legislative election on 
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the other variables, as well as its own “pure” effect. Also, the data for 1982 is only used to 
compute the variation of the variables.  
First, the results show, as expected, that the coefficient for the absolute vote in the 
previous local elections is negative and statistically significant at a 0.01 level for both parties. 
An increase in votes at the 
preceding municipal election 
tends to have a negative 
impact in the following local 
election. A possible 
explanation would be that it is 
easier to lose an absolute 
percentage of the electorate from a larger base. 
Secondly, an increase in votes in the national election has a negative impact in the next 
municipal election for the right of centre party, PSD. The coefficients are statistically significant 
for all the regressions. For the left of centre party, PS, the coefficients signs are not always 
consistent, but remain significant for all the different specifications32. 
Thirdly, an increase in 
inflation helps PSD, but punishes 
PS in the next municipal elections. 
Moreover, an increase in the 
unemployment rate punishes both 
parties, while an increase in the 
real GDP growth rate helps PS and 
hurts PSD. All the coefficients are significant at the 0.05 level.  
                                                 
32 This issue is scrutinised in the section VII. 
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Next, the coefficient for 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡in specification (4) is negative for PSD and positive 
for PS, with the former being significant at the 0.01 level and the latter at the 0.05 level. This 
indicates that incumbency in the legislative election seems to penalise PSD and reward PS. 
Moreover, in specification (5) we have both the economic variables and this dummy. For PSD, 
the coefficient of the dummy is higher (a smaller penalisation) but still significant at the same 
level, while for PS, the coefficient is no longer significant. Furthermore, although the values of 
the coefficients change for the economic variables for PSD, the signs are the same as in 
specification (3) and they are all significant at the 0.1 level. For PS, it is still punished by an 
increase in inflation and in the unemployment rate, but the coefficient for the real GDP growth 
rate is no longer significant. 
Moreover, in specification (6), where the dummy interacts with the economic variables, 
we still have a positive coefficient for inflation and negative for the unemployment rate and the 
real GDP growth rate if PSD incumbent in the national election. For PS, the coefficients for 
inflation and unemployment rate are still negative and significant, and not significant for the 
real GDP growth rate. 
Finally, for the incumbency advantage variable we find statistical significance at the 0.01 
level and positive coefficient for PSD and a non-significant one for PS, meaning that being the 
incumbent at the local level affects positively the votes in the next municipal election for PSD, 
but has no impact on PS. 
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V. Discussion of the Results  
We have to discuss the results in light of the rationales explained mainly in the last part 
of the literature, which we followed in this research. First, incumbency in the legislative election 
seems to only hurt the right of the centre party in the next municipal elections. For PS this effect 
is lost when we introduce the national economic variables.  
Some important conclusion can be drawn from the comparison between specification 
(3) or (5) and (6). Specification (6) allows us to conclude that most of the economic factors 
retain their impact on the election results even if they are incumbent at the national level, i.e. 
voters seem to prefer the right-wing party when inflation rises even if they are the ones in office, 
for example. Moreover, PSD is penalised for an increase in the unemployment rate and the real 
GDP growth rate, if in the government. On the other hand, PS is punished if there’s an increase 
in inflation or in the unemployment rate, if incumbent. The effect of real GDP growth rate isn’t 
statistically significant for the left party.    
When trying to situate the electorate between Swank’s partisan model and Powell and 
Whitten’s ideological responsibility hypothesis, the results are mixed. Following the former 
model, PSD is better suited to deal with an increase in inflation, and thus would gain votes, 
while following the latter would mean that an increase would lead PSD to be held responsible. 
The contrary applies to PS for inflation. Moreover, for unemployment rate the case would be 
the opposite, PS would be better suited to deal with an increase or it would be held responsible 
for it, depending on the theory followed.  
The results show that PSD seems to be perceived as better suited to deal with inflation, 
rather than being held responsible for the variables that its constituency care about the most. PS 
seems to be punished and thus, reflects the perception that they are not as well suited, as they 
would’ve been forgiven (positive coefficient) if they couldn’t be held responsible for an 
increase in inflation. This seems to be in accordance with the Swank’s partisan model. 
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For unemployment, the situation is different. Both parties have negative coefficients 
and thus, it means that PS doesn’t look better suited but rather seems to be held responsible, 
while PSD is already not the one suited. This seems to indicate a slight deviation from the 
ideological responsibility hypothesis. Furthermore, given the fact that a smaller legislature 
party, such as the Communist Party, has a strong municipal representation, voters on the left 
side of the spectrum can split their votes, especially when this party is generally associated with 
more social welfare, further demanded in case of economic hardship. These voters may return 
to their normal partisan alignment in the legislative, although this is out of scope of this 
research.  
Moreover, in the case of prosperity (increase in the real GDP growth rate), PS seems to 
benefit from it at a first glance, positioning it as the “economic boom vote”. But when taking 
into account the incumbency dummy there’s no longer evidence of this phenomenon. 
Conversely, PSD is always punished for economic prosperity. If the rate goes down, PSD 
appears to be considered better suited to deal with it. This seems to indicate that PSD is the 
economic hardship vote whilst PS is the boom vote. The results reflect the complexity of these 
interactions and the way vote intentions are formed. 
Nevertheless, the electorate seems to be evaluate in a retrospective sphere, as it seems to 
take into consideration past performance to evaluate the incumbent. Also, it is very important 
for PSD to already be an incumbent in a certain municipality has it has a positive effect on the 
next local election – incumbency advantage. The same does not apply for PS. For the left-wing 
party, we find no advantage or disadvantage. 
VI. Limitations and Areas for Further Research: 
While the discussed results are, in general terms, in accordance with the various strands of 
the literature, some limitations and areas for further research ought to be presented. 
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Primarily, the number of observations is limited since Portugal is a relatively young 
democracy. It would be of great interest to increase the number of years in the sample. 
Moreover, linked to this is the fact that the variability of the regressors over time isn’t very 
strong. As we can see in Table 2, it has an impact on the coefficient for the votes in the previous 
local election as well as on the Adjusted-R2 and F-Test. This happens because when using time 
fixed effects, they seem to capture the effects of the variables that vary little across time. 
Moreover, we decided to present the regressions with them included, despite adding Table 3 
without them to the appendix (the results are very similar, still) because it controls for the effects 
that are relatively stable over time as well as business cycles and other macroeconomic 
phenomena that wouldn’t be possible to capture in any other way. 
Moreover, it is impossible to control for leader characteristics/popularity due to the fact that 
we are talking about local elections. Also, it would be interesting to inspect the results for the 
elections for the European Parliament and given that the municipal elections do not always 
occur at the middle of the legislative term, a time analysis of the electorate response would be 
interesting. 
VII. Conclusions: 
This analysis unveils several relations intrinsic to the Portuguese Political Economy. First, 
in terms of Incumbency, it shows that the right-wing party is penalized at the municipal election 
for being in power in the national government. Moreover, the model does not seem to apply to 
the left party, displaying mixed results. This may be due to the structural differences between 
both types of elections and the tendency for smaller parties to do better in the sub-national 
verdict. Moreover, at a local level, incumbency helps PSD get more votes, while no significant 
effect is registered for PS. 
Furthermore, this empirical research studies the relation of economic variables and the 
variation of votes for both parties at a municipal level. It shows that an increase in inflation 
Work Project | Nova School of Business and Economics 
 
 27 
helps PSD, but harms PS; an increase in the unemployment rate penalizes both parties; an 
increase in the real GDP growth rate punishes PSD while having no significant impact on PS. 
Moreover, when incumbency is taken into account while studying the effects of the 
economic variables, it reveals interesting features regarding partisanship and electorate 
evaluation of the two main Portuguese parties. First, both parties are held responsible for an 
increase in the unemployment rate, if incumbents. Second, the right-wing party seems to still 
be rewarded even if inflation has increased during their term, while PS is punished. Finally, for 
the real GDP growth rate, one can only say that PSD seems to be punished for an increase. 
Conversely, it is rewarded if there’s a decrease. Thus, ignoring the case for the unemployment 
rate, which can only find a rationale in a setting where voters choose non-mainstream parties, 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Local Vote Variation PSD overall -
0.4032384 
10.49275 -41.67766 62.28 N=1900 
between   2.778255 -11.4475 7.64 n=305 
within   10.16428 -42.13123 61.6171 T-
bar=6.22951 
Local Vote Variation PS overall 0.993416 10.65764 -39.87355 45.32 N=2330 
between   2.435665 -11.44 7.524526 n=305 
within   10.39812 -37.58149 42.9018 T-
bar=7.63934 
Local Lag PS overall 36.23219 14.88941 1.4 76.8 N=2378 
between   10.74941 6.89 67.10125 n=305 
within   10.34711 -5.511559 74.29969 T-
bar=7.79672 
Local Lag PSD overall 39.21491 16.74441 0.96 88.84 N=2083 
between   14.48908 2.8275 72.4425 n=305 
within   8.890185 -6.41759 79.91491 T-
bar=6.82951 
PSLeg overall 0.5 0.5001025 0 1 N=2440 
between   0 0.5 0.5 n=305 
within   0.5001025 0 1 T=8 
PSDLeg overall 0.5 0.5001025 0 1 N=2440 
between   0 0.5 0.5 n=305 
within   0.5001025 0 1 T=8 
Inflation overall 5.880358 6.529538 -
0.8345902 
19.63987 N=2440 
between   0 5.880358 5.880358 n=305 
within   6.529538 -
0.8345902 
19.63987 T=8 
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UR overall 8.452082 3.588974 5.133333 16.45833 N=2440 
between   0 8.452082 8.452082 n=305 
within   3.588974 5.133333 16.45833 T=8 
GDPRate overall 1.279149 3.053379 -2.978319 6.440451 N=2440 
between   0 1.279149 1.279149 n=305 
within   3.053379 -2.978319 6.440451 T=8 
Inflation*PSDLeg overall 4.880828 7.04711 0 19.63987 N=2440 
between   0 4.880828 4.880828 n=305 
within   7.04711 0 19.63987 T=8 
Inflation*PSLeg overall 0.9995296 1.653533 -
0.8345903 
4.394345 N=2440 
between   0 0.9995296 0.9995296 n=305 
within   1.653533 -
0.8345903 
4.394345 T=8 
UR*PSDLeg overall 4.536458 5.558572 0 16.45833 N=2440 
between   0.5001025 4.536458 4.536458 n=305 
within   5.558572 0 16.45833 T=8 
UR*PSLeg overall 3.915624 4.186133 0 10.68333 N=2440 
between   0 3.915624 3.915625 n=305 
within   4.186133 0 10.68333 T=8 
GDPRate*PSDLeg overall 0.7593367 2.505554 -2.043081 6.440451 N=2440 
between   0 0.7593367 0.7593368 n=305 
within   2.505554 -2.043081 6.440451 T=8 
GDPRate*PSLeg overall 0.519812 1.958334 -2.978319 4.426571 N=2440 
between   0 0.519812 0.519812 n=305 
within   1.958334 -2.978319 4.426571 T=8 
Previous National Vote 
PS 
overall 33.7 9.33087 20.77 45.03 N=2440 
between   0 33.7 33.7 n=305 
within   9.33087 20.77 45.03 T=8 
Previous National Vote 
PSD 
overall 36.8325 8.404736 28.77 50.6 N=2440 
between   0 36.8325 36.8325 n=305 
within   8.404736 28.77 50.6 T=8 
Incumbency Advantage overall 0.7594262 0.425195 0 11 N=2440 
between   0.1701492 0.25 1.509426 n=305 
within   0.3923076 -
0.1155738 
  T=8 
 
Table 3 – Regression Results without Time Fixed Effects. 
David José Dias Boavida: Partisanship, Economy and Incumbency 
 
 32 
  
 
